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In their efforts to enhance the safety and security of citizens, governments and law
enforcement agencies look to scientists and engineers to produce modern methods
for preventing, detecting, and prosecuting criminal activities. Whole body scanners,
lie detection technologies, biometrics, etc., are all being developed for incorporation
into the criminal justice apparatus.1 Yet despite their purported security benefits these
technologies often evoke social resistance. Concerns over privacy, ethics, and function-
creep appear repeatedly in analyses of these technologies. It is argued here that scientists
and engineers continue to pay insufficient attention to this resistance; acknowledging the
presence of these social concerns yet failing to meaningfully address them. In so doing
they place at risk the very technologies and techniques they are seeking to develop, for
socially controversial security technologies face restrictions and in some cases outright
banning. By identifying sources of potential social resistance early in the research and
design process, scientists can both engage with the public in meaningful debate and
modify their security technologies before deployment so as to minimize social resistance
and enhance uptake.
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INTRODUCTION
Social constructionism is a sociological theory of knowledge
which holds that our knowledge of the world is not derived
from observing nature, rather that it is constructed through
the social interactions and processes of people (Burr, 2003). By
adopting a social constructionist perspective one can compre-
hend the phenomena of criminality and criminal behavior as
existing from the moment individuals and societies began socially
constructing and adopting laws which proscribed certain acts or
omissions as constituting criminal activities (Newburn, 2007).
Under this formulation that which is considered criminal can
differ spatially (different countries, states, districts, towns have
different laws), by ascribed categories (i.e., different laws for dif-
ferent religious groups, genders, sexual orientations, professions
and/or social classes) and temporally (laws are not “set-in-stone,”
rather are subject to change). Yet while laws can change to
reflect both prevailing social views and the organization of activ-
ities within a society, the slow pace of this change often results
1I am using this umbrella term to cover all the organisations involved in every
stage of the prevention, detection, and prosecution of criminal activities. This
includes: (i) the work of the security services with their roles of collecting
intelligence (both domestic and international) to protect the national security
and economic well-being of a nation as well as supporting the prevention and
detection of serious crimes; (ii) domestic law enforcements organisations such
as police and border agencies with their various roles in preventing, detect-
ing and deterring criminal activities, as well as gathering evidence to assist in
the prosecution of those accused of committing crimes; and (iii) the crim-
inal court system, including the prosecution and defence who make use of
scientific evidence and experts when furthering the case of their clients.
in the law struggling to catch up. The advent of the digital
age, the pace of technological development, and the widespread
adoption of technologies in many societies all pose challenges
for the application of existing laws and the timely creation of
new ones.
This paper begins by examining the phenomenon whereby
states embrace technologies as solutions or fixes for the problem
of crime. The negative consequences of this policy in the form of
social resistance are then discussed. Finally the question is asked
as to why the design and implementation of emerging security
technologies continues to repeat mistakes observed in previous
technologies? Four answers are provided here, including; (i) the
paucity of social education within science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathematics (STEM) courses, (ii) the lack of priority
afforded social and ethical issues within the research and design of
security technologies, (iii) a general failure by STEM practition-
ers in comprehending the importance of social acceptability to the
technologies they create, and (iv) restricted public engagement.
SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES AS TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES
The development and interpretation of new technological
advancements have been adopted with considerable enthusi-
asm by governments, law enforcements agencies, universities
and private companies as potential methods for preventing,
detecting, and prosecuting criminal activities. In this regard
they represent technological fixes for the social problem of
crime; a technological fix is broadly defined as a techno-
logical solution for solving social problems (Weinberg, 1967)
reflecting the views of technological optimists. Technology
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is presented as a panacea for social problems by being
cheaper and more effective than alternative human-centric
approaches for dealing with issues which negatively impact
society.
The current range of technological fixes designed specifically
for addressing crime (hereafter referred to as security technolo-
gies2) continues to increase as scientists and engineers seek to
apply the knowledge and approaches of their specific fields
to this particular goal. Whole body scanners at airports uti-
lize X-ray backscattering or millimeter wave technology so as
to identify metallic and non-metallic objects, plastic and liquid
explosives, flora, fauna, drugs, and cash, concealed within or
beneath the clothing of passengers (European Commission, 2010;
Mitchener-Nissen et al., 2012). Data mining, being the applica-
tion of database technology and techniques (such as modeling
and statistical analysis) to data to identify valid, novel, implicit
and potentially useful information and patterns within that data,
is employed with the aim of analysing intelligence and detect-
ing terrorist activities, fraud, and other criminal patterns (Tien,
2004; Steinbock, 2005; Schermer, 2011). The use of biometrics
enables crime-scene technologies that can assist in the identifica-
tion and prosecution of offenders (such as DNA databases and
fingerprinting technologies), tackling identity fraud, and coun-
teracting illegal immigration (Grijpink, 2006; Goldstein et al.,
2008). And to assist in the investigation and prosecution of crim-
inal acts, lie detection technologies designed to directly access
brain function (including fMRI and EEG) are trying to be
developed by researchers and private companies (Wolpe et al.,
2010). This selection represents a tiny snapshot of the cornucopia
of security technologies both under development and already
implemented.
RESULTING SOCIETAL RESISTANCE
Without further examination it would be tempting to con-
clude that security technologies do indeed constitute justifications
for Weinberg’s vision of technological fixes as the solution to
social problems. However, the notion of the technological fix
has been subject to robust criticism. It has been described as
“a quick cheap fix using inappropriate technology that creates
more problems than it solves” (Rosner, 2004). The truth of
this statement is evident within the social controversies (or in
the case of the lie detection technologies, the possible future
social controversies) produced by each of the security technol-
ogy examples provided above. Whole body scanners have been
accused of conducting digital strip-searches (Klitou, 2008), and
the backscatter variation is to be removed from US airports
because of the images produced. Data mining has been associ-
ated with both a fear of totalitarian-style state observation, as
well as the targeting of individuals by governments (Steinbock,
2005). Different biometric technologies can discriminate against
various groups within society and are plagued by the prob-
lem of false positives (Hunter, 2005; Whitley and Hosein, 2010).
2By security technologies I am referring to the product of an engineering
endeavour which seeks to deter, prevent, detect or prosecute crimes, and/or
enhance the security of individuals, their property, or the state (including its
infrastructure).
Additionally the UKs DNA database (the largest in the world)
has created controversy by holding the details of innocent peo-
ple and a disproportionate number of samples from ethnic
minorities. And the new generation of potential lie-detection
technologies have faced criticism over the potential ethical,
social, and legal implications of their operation to existing
social and legal institutions should they ever be made to
definitively and consistently “work.” This social resistance to
a security technology begins individually, as solitary citizens
question the rationale and/or operation of a particular mea-
sure. These may be individuals who actively critique govern-
ment security policy, those who prioritize privacy and liberty,
or as is often the case these are individuals who find them-
selves adversely impacted upon by a security technology without
just cause. For example; individuals who are incorrectly pre-
vented from flying because either they have the same name
as another person on a no-fly list, or their details have been
added in error to such a list without them being previously
notified or provided a way to rectify this error. Recognition
of an individual’s issues with a security technology can now
begin to coalesce into social resistance once knowledge of their
plight becomes known to others. The media, lawyers, NGO’s,
social activists, political figures, and independent commission-
ers amongst others can all assist is raising awareness here,
which in turn can influence other citizens thereby snowballing
the effect and reducing support for the security technology in
question.
The manifestation of social resistance present in the technolo-
gies discussed above represents only a snap-shot of the contro-
versies produced by security technologies which have in the past
undermined their social acceptability and widespread uptake. In
an on-going examination of security technologies which have
evoked social resistance, I have identified numerous recurring
controversies which continue to arise within new security tech-
nologies with depressing regularity. These can be organized into
eight high-level categories; the causing of physical and mental
harm, questions of legality, financial costs, liberties and human
rights issues, broader public responses, issues of functionality,
security and safety issues, and abuse/misuse issues. A selection
of commonly recurring controversies includes; privacy concerns,
function creep, false positive/negative rates, lack of public trust,
the failure of a technology to achieve what its designers claim
it can do, and the potential for the technology to be abused by
the state.
WHY NEW SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES REPEAT THE
MISTAKES OF THE PAST
The question which needs addressing here is why have lessons
not been learnt such that new security technologies con-
sistently evoke such ethical and social controversy? I sug-
gest there are four complementary elements underpinning the
answer to this question. The first is the paucity of social
and ethical education within university STEM courses. Within
university engineering courses in the UK it is highly likely
that a student can (and will) complete their education with-
out ever undertaking a single lecture on the importance of
identifying and incorporating social and ethics factors into
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their work. This is despite the creation of the field of engineer-
ing ethics which arose in the early 1980s following a number
of technological developments, designs and failures which nega-
tively impacted human wellbeing (Johnson and Wetmore, 2008).
The situation is repeated within the hard sciences with the pos-
sible exception of medical ethics. For those who counter with
the claim that ethics and ethical research is ensured by the pres-
ence of university ethics boards; while a particular research or
design project may meet all official conduct requirements such
that it is considered ethical, this does not mean that what is
being undertaken or created will be accepted by the public. The
diverse groups which comprise a society ultimately determine
what is considered socially or ethically acceptable, and yet uni-
versity engineering and hard science courses regularly fail new
researchers and designers by not equipping them with an under-
standing of this fact nor the tools to adequately interact with the
public.
The second element in the lack of priority afforded social
and ethical issues within research and design projects. Interviews
with engineers and scientists engaged in the process of design-
ing and developing new security technologies have highlighted
a clear hierarchical structure to the design process. For com-
mercial projects it begins with cost; if it is determined that
there is not a viable market for a product then it will not be
produced. If this test is passed and the project is considered feasi-
ble than design specifications are produced in accordance with
the client’s requirements and the product is created. Similarly
with university research projects, the presence of funding and/or
the potential for future commercial exploitation dictates the
research undertaken. When this is directed toward addressing
perceived security deficiencies the focus is on attaining a spe-
cific security goal. These processes leave little space for the
consideration and incorporation of social and ethical issues—
the focus is on “can we achieve what we have set out to
achieve,” and not “is this a socially acceptable way of achiev-
ing the desired goals” or “are these goals socially acceptable
per se.”
The third element is a general failure by scientist and engi-
neers to comprehend just how important social acceptabil-
ity is to the life cycles of their technologies. In the major-
ity, scientists and engineers do not develop an apprecia-
tion of the importance of identifying and addressing social
concerns until they are confronted by social resistance; a
point often reached after a product has been released to
market.
The fourth element is the challenge of, and the resistance to,
achieving effective public engagement in relation to the design
of security technologies. The arguments in favor public engage-
ment hold that just as democracy derives its legitimacy through
participation, so too will increasing participation within the
development of new or controversial technologies help to infuse
the finished products with similar legitimacy and reduce soci-
etal resistance. The primary argument against is that lay people
are handicapped by a lack the technological literacy, or access
to and understanding of, security-sensitive intelligence, which
together constrain their ability to provide relevant input or
make informed decisions. But as Kleinman (2005) highlights,
the flawed nature of such views is driven home by the fact that
experts3 are never value-neutral, unbiased, all-seeing individu-
als; rather are bounded by the nature of their expert knowl-
edge and will necessarily view a phenomenon from a partial
perspective. In other words, experts are handicapped to view
the world through blinkers and in this respect have similari-
ties with the very lay public whose input they would seek to
exclude.
By introducing socially unacceptable technologies in the first
place, trust in both the developers and the end-users (i.e., govern-
ments and agencies of the state) is threatened, research and design
capacity is diverted from acceptable technologies, and money is
wasted that could otherwise have been used for legitimate pro-
grammes. The challenge becomes identifying what is acceptable
and unacceptable before a technology is developed and deployed.
By accepting that judgments over acceptability of a technology
differ between social groups and that rejection of a technology
can lead to its permanent inferiority through neglect (MacKenzie
andWajcman, 1999), the consideration of wider social and ethical
issues upstream in the design process to anticipate and miti-
gate negative social reactions becomes both a valid and logical
response.
CONCLUSION
The list of technologies developed which have been banned or
their use restricted in various societies, (not necessarily because
of deficiencies in the underlying science) but because the devel-
opers did not seek to anticipate and mitigate social resistance
through upstream design modifications is long and growing. It
includes backscatter body scanners, instances of data mining,
less lethal weapons, polygraph lie detectors, CCTV, national ID
card, etc.
To avoid the ignominy of this situation for emerging security
technologies developers must take meaningful steps to identify
sources of potential social resistance early in the research and
design process. This requires truly reflexive engagement with the
public to identify concerns which then can be translated into
upstream design requirements; thereby heading off social resis-
tance before it coalesces and becomes synonymous with the tech-
nology being developed. The enormity of this challenge cannot be
overestimated for if a proposed technology cannot by created in
such a fashion which respects and reflects the values held within a
society, then those developing the technology are wasting valuable
time, money and resources on research which will ultimately be
rejected.
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